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Certification

This provider is certified: it passes every applicable behavior in the BigFleet conformance program — the same bar every provider must clear — so you can trust it to create, configure, drain, and delete machines correctly under load, failure, and restart. You do not need to run anything here to use it in production; this page exists if you want to reproduce that verdict yourself.

“Certified” here means exactly what it means in the conformance program: the provider passes both the upstream authoritative baseline and this repo’s extension suite, with no failures and no skipped-as-failed behaviors.

One command

Terminal window
make certify-upcloud

That target (hack/run-certify.sh upcloud) is fully credential-free. It:

  1. Resolves the bigfleet checkout that owns the authoritative contract — reusing $BIGFLEET_SRC if set, otherwise cloning the exact version pinned in the provider’s go.mod into .cache/bigfleet-src.
  2. Builds ./bin/upcloud and boots it with --provider=certify --seed-count=256. It uses --use-fake-backend, so no UpCloud account is touched — the extension suite consumes a fresh machine per behavior, hence the generous seed.
  3. Runs the upstream baseline (test/conformance/ in the bigfleet repo), then the extension suite (conformance/suite, build-tagged certify), both dialing that one endpoint.
  4. Prints CERTIFIED: upcloud passed the upstream baseline + the extension suite — or fails non-zero on the first failing behavior, tearing the provider down.

Override the port with PORT=....

What the two suites check

The certification harness is a pure black-box gRPC client: it dials --addr and uses only the wire RPCs of bigfleet.v1alpha1.CapacityProvider — no providerkit imports, no process introspection. It detects what the provider supports through a Capabilities probe and skips inapplicable behaviors with a reason (never failing them) — which is how the SPOT-only behaviors are handled here (see Profiles).

Upstream baseline — the immovable, authoritative contract maintained in the bigfleet repo. We run it verbatim and never modify it; it is the floor every certified provider clears.

Extension suite — the BigFleet conformance program: a frozen registry of behaviors across lifecycle, the transition matrix, fencing, concurrency, metadata, field-shape, list/pagination, timeouts/failure, durability, scale/soak, and property/fuzz. It deepens the baseline under distinct, append-only ids. This provider clears every applicable one.

Profiles the UpCloud provider claims

The harness certifies a provider against the profiles it advertises; behaviors outside a claimed profile skip-as-pass. The harness probes the provider’s Capabilities over the wire and skips inapplicable behaviors with a reason (never failing them).

  • core — every provider (lifecycle, errors, fencing, concurrency, metadata, field-shape, list, property). The UpCloud provider claims core.
  • cloud — implements Delete (Idle → Speculative). The UpCloud provider does (Delete = stop + DeleteServerAndStorages), so it claims cloud.
  • spot — exposes SPOT capacity. UpCloud cloud servers are on-demand only, so the provider does not claim spot; the SPOT-interruption_probability > 0 behaviors skip-as-pass. The genuine, provider-declared interruption_probability is exactly 0.0, which is the correct value here, not a forgotten field — see Configuration.
  • bare-metal — the UpCloud provider serves regular on-demand cloud servers, not bare metal, so it does not claim it.
  • fault / durable / scale — failure→FAILED, restart recovery, and scale lanes. These come from providerkit and pass by construction for any kit-based provider; run them through the report runner.

So the UpCloud provider’s claimed profiles are core and cloud (the substrate-specific lanes), with fault/durable/scale passing by construction via the kit. It does not claim spot (no spot market) or bare-metal.

make certify-upcloud runs the credential-free core gate (baseline + the black-box extension). The complete certification — every applicable lane — runs through the bfconformance runner and emits a JUnit + JSON report with a verdict:

Terminal window
make report-upcloud PROFILE=core,cloud
# -> VERDICT: CERTIFIED, writes conformance-report/upcloud/{report.json,junit.xml}

You can add the kit-provided lanes to the same run when you want the full sweep:

Terminal window
make report-upcloud PROFILE=core,cloud,fault,durable,scale

Note the profile list omits spot (UpCloud offers no spot product) and bare-metal.

Certifying a real endpoint

make certify-upcloud certifies the fake backend in CI. To certify the provider talking to real UpCloud, run it yourself against your account and point the extension suite at it:

Terminal window
# 1. Boot the provider against real UpCloud (see Install & deploy / Configuration).
./bin/upcloud \
--addr 127.0.0.1:9099 \
--zone fi-hel1 \
--template 0100...0200 \
--offerings ./offerings.json \
--ssh-key ./id --ssh-pubkey "$(cat ./id.pub)" \
--base-user-data ./hook-init.yaml
# UPCLOUD_USERNAME / UPCLOUD_PASSWORD in the environment.
# 2. In another shell, run the extension suite against that endpoint.
go -C conformance test -tags=certify -count=1 ./suite/... -target=127.0.0.1:9099

A real run exercises the full lifecycle — CreateServer → wait-for-started → SSH Configure/Drain → stop + DeleteServerAndStorages — so the endpoint needs an API sub-account (see Credentials), a valid --template, an image that ships the on-host hook, and SSH reachability to the servers. It will create and destroy real servers (and their storage); certify in a throwaway account and tear the servers down.

See also

  • Conformance program — the behavior registry, profiles, and how to add a behavior.
  • Configuration — why interruption_probability is a genuine zero on UpCloud, and why the provider does not claim spot.
  • Credentials & auth — the API sub-account a real-endpoint certification run needs.